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REVOLUTIONARIES OR
BARGAINERS?
Negotiators for a New International
Economic Order
By HAROLD K. JACOBSON, DUSAN SIDJANSKI,
JEFFREY RODAMAR, and ALICE HOUGASSIAN-RUDOVICH*
SINCE the heads of state of the Non-aligned Movement issued theircall for the creation of a new international economic order (NIEO)
at their meeting in Algiers in September 1973, this demand has been
in the forefront of North-South economic negotiations. In the extensive
literature that the NIEO controversy has spawned, little attention has
been paid to the individuals who have been involved in the negotiations.
This study may fill that gap, and thus contribute to a better understand-
ing of the NIEO talks. It analyzes an important category of these actors—
individuals, principally from less developed countries (LDCs)—who ne-
gotiated economic issues in international governmental organizations
(IGOs). It examines aspects of their behavior in the negotiations, and it
explores their attitudes toward some of the substantive issues at stake.
There are several reasons why behavior and attitudes could affect the
outcome of the NIEO negotiations. Since the discussions are largely
conducted within the framework of IGOs, the processes of these insti-
tutions will to some extent shape the outcome. To understand these
processes fully, one must comprehend not only the formal rules for
making decisions, but also the behavior of the participants. Because
crucial aspects of behavior are not recorded in documents, data gained
through interviews and observation are an important supplementary
source.
Knowing the attitudes of the participants is also important for a full
understanding of what has happened and what might happen in IGOs.
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The attitudes of delegates are likely to be reflected in their communi-
cations with their governments and thus can affect the framing of their
instructions. Their outlook is also almost certain to affect the way in
which they execute these instructions. In cases where participants are
not instructed, the effect of their attitudes can be even more direct.
Attitudes, however, are not permanently fixed, but can be altered by
experience. Scholars have long assumed that participation in interna-
tional institutions would have an impact on participants' attitudes; this
issue has been explored empirically, though mainly to analyze whether
or not participation has led to greater support for international insti-
tutions. The interest here is to examine the interaction in shaping in-
dividuals' views on substantive problems between: (i) personal attributes,
such as age, educational background, and work experience, and (2) role
defined in terms of position (whether an individual is an IGO official
or the representative of a state, and if the latter, what type of state) and
function (the nature of the negotiations in which the individual is par-
ticipating). This interaction can be a significant consequence of partic-
ipation in IGOs, and an important dynamic of negotiations.
THE NIEO CONTROVERSY
The call for the creation of a new international economic order is a
demand to change international regimes so that they would contribute
more substantially to accelerating the economic development of LDCs.
The LDCs' proposals to achieve this end were embodied in the Program
of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
adopted on May 1, 1974, by the 6th Special Session of the United Nations
General Assembly and in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States—which they pushed through the General Assembly that fall.1
The adoption of the program of action and the charter launched the
controversy that has since pervaded international economic institutions
and negotiations.
The industrialized states of the West have in varying degrees opposed
the LDCs' proposals. Their opposition has had both philosophical and
practical roots. Some of the proposals involve greater interference with
market mechanisms than the governments of several of the Western
states believe is wise. Few of them are willing to bear the burden that
full implementation of the LDCs' proposals would involve. The final
vote on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States illustrates
their positions: Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted against
' U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX).
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the resolution; Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, and Spain abstained. Australia, Finland, Greece, Ice-
land, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, and Turkey—all also OECD
members—voted for the resolution, along with 112 LDCs and com-
munist states.
The LDCs' proposals have been interpreted as a call for a revolu-
tionary transformation of the existing economic connection between the
LDCs and the industrialized states, as a theatrical concoction induced
by the availability of international institutions and their peculiar pro-
cedures, or as a bargaining effort to improve the position of the LDCs
within the framework of existing relationships and institutions. Their
ultimate meaning, of course, will emerge only as the negotiations prog-
ress. In the meantime, it may be possible to clarify some issues and
narrow the range of possibilities. The nature of the proposals provides
some clues. The behavior and the attitudes of the negotiators may provide
others.
THE DATA SET
The interviews on which the following analyses of the behavior and
attitudes of participants in the NIEO negotiations are based were con-
ducted in Europe in the summer of 1976 during the early days of the
NIEO confrontation. All of the respondents were participants in ne-
gotiations that were in progress at the time. Sixty-nine were delegates
who represented states in the Group of 77 (G-77), the LDC caucus in
international institutions; four were nationals of G-77 states who were
employed by IGOs; and seven were nationals of OECD states. Six of
the OECD delegates were nationals of states that voted for the Charter
on the Economic Rights and Duties of States; one was a national of a
state that abstained. Four OECD delegates were nationals of three states
that had per capita GNPs that were smaller than those of several LDCs;
thus, the OECD states that the delegates represented had many of the
characteristics of those of their G-77 colleagues.
The 80 respondents were nationals of a total of 56 states, 51 of them
members of the Group of 77 and 5 of OECD.2 Thirty-five, or 44 percent,
were participants in the Tokyo Round of negotiations within the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the others were participants
in the 22nd session of the Governing Council of the United Nations
Development Program, various working groups of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 61st session
' They included one national from each of 38 states, 2 from 14 states, 3 from 2 states,
and 4 from 2 states.
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of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the first
meeting of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers (the supreme decision-
making body provided for in the Lome Convention which structures
the relationships between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries
and the European Economic Community).3
Because of the difficulty of interviewing delegates to international
conferences, we interviewed whom we could, scientific canons notwith-
standing. Since the more active participants in the negotiations were
easier to identify, they tended to predominate among the individuals
included in the sample. Only two persons refused to be interviewed.
On the whole, the sample of G-77 states is reasonably representative,
both in terms of income levels and types of economic system.4
None of the questions involved fixed responses. Each interview was
coded separately by two of the authors; then the differences between
the codings were reconciled by discussion among the members of the
research team and, in a small number of cases, by one of the principal
investigators.
3 The distribution of the respondents among the five institutions is as follows:
GATT UNDP UNCTAD ECOSOC ACP-EEC Other Total
G-77 delegates 30 10 7 8 13 1 69
G-77 IGO
employees 1 0 1 0 1 1 4
OECD delegates 4 1 _ 1 1 0 _0 7 _
35~ n " 9 9 14 2 80
(44%) (14%) (11%) (11%) (17%) (3%)
The two respondents under "other" cannot be categorized by negotiations. One IGO em-
ployee had participated in several international economic negotiations, but had not partic-
ipated in any in 1976, and one delegate had just taken up his post, but had not yet participated
in a negotiation.
4
 The World Bank divides LDCs into low-income countries (those with per capita GNP
of $300 or less in 1979), middle-income countries (those with per capita GNP of more than
$300 in 1979), and capital-surplus oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait). See
IBRD, World Development Report, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1979). The distribution
among the three categories of the 51 G-77 states that are included in this "opportunity"
sample (39% low-income, 59% middle-income, and 2% capital-surplus oil exporters) almost
exactly duplicates the distribution of the 95 states included in the World Bank's classifications
(39%, 58%, and 3%, respectively). In its annual surveys, Freedom House categorizes states
according to the economic ideology of their governments as capitalist, mixed, or socialist.
(See Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom—VII," Freedom at Issue,
No. 39 [January-February, 1977], 5-15; criteria used for categorization are found on p. 12.)
In this categorization, which reflects the situation in 1976, of the 104 countries that would
be included among the LDCs as that term is used here (excluding Asian and Caribbean
states with centrally planned economies), 48% had capitalist economic systems, 33% had
mixed systems, and 19% had socialist systems. In our sample of G-77 states, 53% had
capitalist economic systems, 31% had mixed systems, and 16% had socialist systems. In our
sample, capitalist economic systems are thus slightly overrepresented, and mixed and socialist
systems are slightly underrepresented. Because this sample contains multiple respondents
from some states, the proportion of respondents falling in the several categories is different
from the proportion of states. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents were nationals of
low-income countries, 62% were nationals of medium-income countries, and 1 % came from
capital-surplus oil exporters. Fifty-six percent of the respondents were nationals of states
with capitalist economic systems, 27% came from mixed systems, and 17% came from
socialist systems.
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PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEGOTIATORS
The negotiators in the sample were overwhelmingly male, well-trained
(largely at Western universities), cosmopolitan, and experienced. The
characteristics of the respondents did not vary significantly with the
institutional framework of the negotiations, except that a substantially
higher proportion of the respondents engaged in the GATT negotiations
were members of their countries' permanent missions in Geneva, and
more than a majority of those participating in the UNCTAD negoti-
ations were regularly employed by functional ministries in their home
countries. However, these differences appear to have had little conse-
quence either in terms of reported behavior or expressed attitudes.
Contrary to the inference that might be drawn from the unity among
the less developed countries displayed in roll-call votes such as that on
the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, the respondents
in this sample displayed a wide range of views. Even nationals from
the same state did not always agree. They were more likely to agree,
however, when reporting behavior than when giving their attitudes
about policy issues.
SHAPING STATES' POLICIES
As a point of departure, delegates were asked how their countries
determined their positions on the issues involved in the NIEO negoti-
ations in which they were participants. The responses indicated over-
whelmingly that the delegates were acting primarily as instructed agents.
All of the 7 OECD delegates and more than 90 percent of the 61 G-77
delegates who gave codable responses stated—either as their sole answer
or as a part of a more complex answer—that the position of their country
was determined by decisions in the national capital. No respondent said
that the delegation alone determined its position.
These responses contrast sharply with those to a similar question a
decade earlier by delegates to conferences of the World Health Organ-
ization (WHO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO).' In
that case, a much smaller proportion of the delegates mentioned decisions
in their national capitals. The difference fits with the impression that
governments tend to take negotiations about economic issues more se-
riously than they do negotiations about social issues. Another factor
explaining the difference may be the development of national bureau-
cracies in LDCs. Members of the Group of 77 were in a much stronger
position in 1976 than they had been a decade earlier: they had trained
5
 See Harold K. Jacobson, "Deriving Data from Delegates to International Assemblies:
A Research Note," International Organization, xxi (Summer 1967), 592-613.
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and experienced personnel who were capable of giving instructions to
their negotiators.
It is indicative of strengthened bureaucracies that the process of de-
veloping instructions in LDC as well as in OECD governments appears
to include considerable interdepartmental consultation, usually involving
the foreign ministry and the economic ministry. In addition, all of the
OECD delegates and 80 percent (n = 52) of the LDC delegates indicated
that, for some issues at least, consultation with domestic interest groups
was part of the process of determining their countries' positions. Most
frequently and specifically mentioned by both were manufacturers' and
producers' groups.
Interactions among LDCs also played an important role in deter-
mining the position of the delegations. Almost half (46 percent, n = 28)
of the G-77 delegates stated that some form of consultation with other
LDC delegates or governments contributed to determining their coun-
tries' positions. By contrast, none of the OECD delegates mentioned
consultations with other states.
Thus we find that LDC delegates in NIEO negotiations are hardly
less instructed than those from the Western countries; the processes by
which these instructions in both groups of countries are formulated
involve a variety of domestic institutions. International economic rela-
tions have important domestic consequences for less developed and in-
dustrialized states; as a consequence, ministries with responsibilities for
their countries' domestic economies are likely to seek to influence the
positions their countries take in international negotiations about eco-
nomic issues. For LDCs, consultation with other LDCs is also important
for, among other reasons, the bargaining strength they derive from their
numbers and from taking a uniform position. Much of the literature
about the NIEO negotiations has tended to emphasize the G-77 caucus
and the solidarity of its members. The data gained from our interviews
underscore that the positions of the LDCs have deep roots in their
national governments; group consultation in IGOs is a secondary rather
than a primary factor.
International actors also played a part in the NIEO negotiations. The
role of secretariats in preparing documents for international conferences
is well known, but the extent of consultation between national delegates
and representatives of international organizations is less well understood.
Our questionnaire contained several items about consultation with IGOs.
The responses indicated that the delegates engaged in an impressive
amount of consultation with members of IGO secretariats. The answers
to specific questions—whether they consulted the secretariats of GATT
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and UNCTAD during the- negotiations—are particularly interesting.
Seventy-five percent (n = 3) of the OECD delegates and 72 percent of
the G-77 delegates (n = 44) affirmed that they consulted members of the
GATT secretariat; 40 percent of the OECD delegates (n = 2) and 85
percent of the G-77 delegates (n = 52) said they consulted with the
UNCTAD secretariat. The interaction between GATT and UNCTAD
delegates and the secretariats of the two organizations is notable. Ninety-
three percent of the G-77 delegates to GATT (n = 28) said unambig-
uously that they consulted members of the GATT secretariat, and the
remaining two gave a qualified affirmative response (whether or not
they did depended upon circumstances). What is even more striking is
that all 30 of the G-77 delegates to GATT said without qualification
that they consulted members of the UNCTAD secretariat, and half
(n = 3) of those G-77 delegates to UNCTAD who answered the question
responded similarly with respect to consultations with the GATT sec-
retariat.
Some commentators on the NIEO negotiations maintain that LDCs
aspire to have UNCTAD displace GATT as the principal forum for
negotiations about commercial policy. In view of the attachment of the
Western industrialized countries to GATT and its procedures, that is
unlikely to happen. However, the UNCTAD secretariat has become an
important source of assistance to LDCs in GATT negotiations, and
is used extensively. Furthermore, contrary to the general impression
that they are hostile to GATT, at least some LDCs utilize the GATT
secretariat as a source of assistance in negotiations conducted within
UNCTAD. These interactions are undoubtedly made easier by the fact
that both GATT and UNCTAD are located in Geneva, and many
members of permanent missions participate in negotiations organized
by both institutions.
Beyond consulting IGOs, many of the delegates also reported a strong
propensity to consult international non-governmental organizations
(INGOs). Forty-nine percent of the G-77 delegates (n = 32) said that
they had consulted INGOs during the course of the negotiations. Del-
egates participating in the negotiations conducted within the framework
of the United Nations Development Program and the U.N. Economic
and Social Council were somewhat more likely to consult INGOs than
those participating in the other three sets of negotiations—probably
because of the more diverse subject matter covered by UNDP and
ECOSOC, which attracts INGOs to their sessions, and because of the
greater INGO representation allowed by their procedures. Delegates
from socialist states were considerably less likely to consult INGOs than
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those from capitalistor mixed economies, reflecting the relatively smaller
role of non-governmental organizations within socialist systems.
Despite the extensive consultations in which they engaged, G-77 del-
egates did not feel completely satisfied with their situation. When they
were asked if things could be done to improve their countries' capacity
to conduct the negotiations, 52, or 81 percent, responded yes. Twenty-
four mentioned that they needed more experts, 14 desired better com-
munications and data analysis facilities, and 11 wanted more information.
Later in the interview, respondents were asked directly if they were
handicapped by a lack of information. Although 37 percent (n = 24) said
no, the other answers were positive in varying degrees. We inferred
from their statements that by "information," they primarily meant anal-
yses directed specifically at the interests of their own countries.
PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE AND POLARIZATION
Beyond wanting to learn how negotiators behaved, we also wanted
to learn how they perceived the negotiating processes. We were partic-
ularly interested in their perceptions of influence and alignments. To
the question whether some countries had more influence on the outcome
of the negotiations than others, 85 percent (n = 57) of the G-77 delegates
answered yes: only in the ACP-EEC Council did more say no than yes.
When they were asked to specify which countries (we coded up to three
responses), the United States was mentioned more frequently than any
other country; the U.S., members of the EEC, and Japan accounted for
almost two-thirds of the countries specifically mentioned; 78 percent of
the countries that were specifically mentioned were members of the
OECD. The West was clearly and broadly perceived as having influence
in the negotiations. The only G-77 countries to be mentioned more than
once were Brazil (three times) and India (twice). The U.S.S.R. was
mentioned only three times, which is indicative of the limited role the
Soviet Union has in economic negotiations.
Economic strength figured prominently in the negotiators' under-
standing of the bases of influence. Seventy-four percent of the respond-
ents (n = 42) said that the states they mentioned were influential in the
negotiations because of their economic strength or their relatively high
GNP. Other reasons frequently given for countries having greater in-
fluence were negotiating skill (mentioned 13 times) and relatively large
financial contributions to international organizations (9 times).
In addition to determining the extent to which the respondents per-
ceived influence in the NIEO negotiations to be stratified, we also sought
to find out the degree to which they perceived the negotiations as a
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polarized bloc-to-bloc confrontation. All respondents were ranked on a
polarization-perception index according to their answers to four ques-
tions.6
Roll-call analyses of voting in the U.N. Assembly portray the nego-
tiating process as an unrelieved North-South, polarized bloc-to-bloc
confrontation. There were much greater nuances in the perceptions of
the negotiators whom we interviewed. Figure i shows the distribution
of the 72 negotiators who answered the questions in the polarization
index. More than two-thirds of them gave responses of the polarization-
perception type to one or two of the questions only. Twelve gave no
polarization-perception responses at all, while 9 gave three or four such
answers.
Table 1 shows how the respondents were distributed on the polari-
zation-perception index according to their positions in the negotiations.
A striking feature of the table is the difference between LDC nationals
who were IGO employees and those who served as their countries'
delegates. None of those who were secretariat officials had a polarization
perspective. Since, because of its components, the polarization index is
slanted against the West, it is more surprising that the OECD delegates
score at all than that their scores are lower than those of the G-77
6
 The following answers are illustrative of those that were scored as indicating a perception
of polarized bloc-to-bloc confrontation:
(Q17) With which country is your country most frequently aligned during this round
of negotiations?
A. Group of 77 and all developing countries, or in the case of the ACP-EEC Council,
ACP countries.
(Q6b) Why so these issues [mentioned in response to a preceding question] create greater
divergences [in the negotiations]?
A. Developed and less developed countries can't agree; proposals by developed
countries aren't acceptable to LDCs; developed countries want a bigger share of
the market.
(Qi7b) Which countries most frequently oppose the solutions sought by your country
during this round of negotiations?
A. The U.S., the EEC, and Japan; the developed countries; OECD; some combi-
nation of EEC member states, the U.S., and Japan.
(Q6ac) Why do you think that these issues [mentioned in response to the preceding
question] are not included [in this round of negotiations]?
A. Developed countries prevent their being discussed.
These questions are listed in descending order of the frequency with with which a polar-
ization-perception type response was given. There were 39 such responses for the first
question, 32 for the second, 20 for the third, and 8 for the fourth. Negotiators who gave
polarization-perception responses to all four questions were given a score of 5; those with
3 such responses, a score of 4; with 2, a score of 3; and with 1, a score of 2. Negotiators
who answered the questions but did not give any polarizarion-perception type response
were given a score of 1. Those who did not answer any of the four questions were given
a score of 0, and were excluded from subsequent analyses. Applying a Guttman scale to
the four questions coded in this manner yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of .917.
The application of a Guttman scale with the missing data and negative responses collapsed
yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of .92. Jackson plus percentage ratios are, respectively,
.73 and .75.
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FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF NEGOTIATORS
ACCORDING TO PERCEPTIONS OF POLARIZATION
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delegates. The explanation may lie in the fact that some of the OECD
delegates represented countries that have lower per capita GNPs than
those of some of the G-77 delegates. These OECD countries and some
of their delegates perceived their economic interests as paralleling those
of LDCs and obviously felt that their economic advance was blocked
by the richest states. As we have seen, most of these countries joined
the LDCs in voting for the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.
Negotiators participating in the GATT Tokyo Round were most
likely to have a high score on the polarization-perception index: those
participating in UNCTAD were next, and those participating in the
ACP-EEC Council were least likely to have a high score. GATT and
UNCTAD dealt with trade issues, where conflicts of interest could be
substantial: it is therefore not surprising that perceptions of polarization
were highest among participants in these negotiations.
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POLARIZATION
Score on
Polarization
Perception Index
1
2
3
4
5
TABLE 1
PERCEPTIONS OF NEGOTIATORS ACCORDING
(percentages)
G-77 National
IGO Employee
(n=3)
100
OECD
Delegate
(n=6)
33.3
33.3
33.3
TO POSITION
G-77
Delegate
(n=63)
11.1
38.1
36.5
11.1
3.2
Chi square 18.22, level of significance .02
The positions that individuals held and the functions they performed
were strongly related to the tendency to perceive negotiations as polar-
ized. G-77 delegates engaged in negotiations where substantial conflicts
of interest are possible were more likely to perceive polarization than
those of their colleagues who were engaged in other types of negotiations,
or delegates from other types of states.7 In other words, the negotiators'
perception of polarization was directly related to what they were doing.
Some observers of the NIEO negotiations have noted that the extent
to which G-77 delegates perceive polarization varies. They argue that
confrontations in international economic negotiations will ease eventu-
ally because, as countries progress economically, they will become less
confrontationist: they will have a greater interest in the existing economic
order and will therefore be less inclined to challenge it. The data analyzed
here provide no support for this position. On the contrary, the higher
the level of per capita GNP in a delegate's country, the more likely the
delegate was to have a high score on the polarization-perception index.
A least-squares regression analysis—using a delegate's score on the po-
larization-perception index as the dependent variable, and his or her
country's per capita GNP in current 1976 dollars (n = 62) as the inde-
pendent variable8—produced the following equation:
7
 By using the respondents' positions on the polarization-perception index as the dependent
variable, and the two components of role as independent variables, we arrive at the following
least-squares regression results (n = j2):
Polarization perception = 1.21 + .72 Position + .56 Function
(Standard error .21) (Standard error .20)
R square .20, standard error of estimate .83, level of significance .0004
(The partial coefficient is unstandardized.)
8
 Source for per capita GNP data: International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, World Ban\ Atlas 1978 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1978).
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Polarization perception = 2.31 + .0004 per capita G N P
(Standard error .0001)
R square .10, standard error of estimate .91, level of significance .01
(The partial coefficient is unstandardized.)
This result corresponds to findings concerning individuals as well as
to the recent experience of decolonization. Individuals who have begun
to make economic progress are more likely to push hard to better their
situation than those who are stagnating in poverty. Similarly, territories
that had achieved some political privileges were more likely to bridle
under colonial rule than those that had not gained any such privileges.
Thus, it seems unlikely that economic progress among LDCs will lessen
the conflict in international economic negotiations between LDCs and
industrialized countries.
NEGOTIATORS' PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
In turning from process to substance, the negotiators' attitudes con-
cerning broad issues involved in development strategies are an appro-
priate starting point. We asked the respondents, "What do you think
are the most promising ways of promoting the economic growth of
developing countries during the next decade?" Fifty-eight respondents
discussed both international and domestic measures and 17 discussed
only international measures; this finding reflects an understandable pro-
pensity among persons involved in international institutions to concen-
trate on international measures.
In analyzing the responses, we coded as many as three international
and three domestic measures. The various international measures men-
tioned by the respondents have been grouped into four broad categories,
and the domestic measures into five categories. The four categories of
international measures are: (1) increasing the flow of economic assistance
to LDCs; (2) improving conditions for the sale of primary commodities
exported by LDCs; (3) improving access to the markets of developed
countries for manufactured goods exported by LDCs; and (4) restruc-
turing international economic institutions and the relevant international
political processes. Of the 75 respondents, 59 percent discussed measures
in more than one category, while 41 percent concentrated on one cate-
gory only. GATT negotiators typically mentioned items in two or
three categories; the average was 2.29. The average number of categories
mentioned by negotiators in the other forums were: ECOSOC, 2.13;
UNDP, 1.70; ACP-EEC, 1.67; UNCTAD, 1.5. Although various
scholars and government officials have argued that as an institution,
UNCTAD has a broader view of development than GATT, the per-
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ceptions of participants in the GATT negotiations appear to have been
broader than those of UNCTAD negotiators.
Fifty-nine percent of the respondents (n = 44) discussed various meas-
ures related to increasing the flow of financial resources to LDCs; no
other category of international measures was mentioned by more than
half of the respondents. Restructuring international economic institutions
and political processes was mentioned by 45 percent (n = 34); improving
conditions for the sale of primary commodities by 41 percent (n = 3i);
and improving market access for manufactured goods by 37 percent
(n = 28).
The issues discussed by the negotiators were not strongly related to
their personal attributes, but they were related to aspects of their roles.
Participants from socialist states were considerably more inclined to
mention increasing the flow of financial assistance than those from states
with capitalist or mixed economies (80 percent versus 56 percent). In
addition, negotiators who had been or were currently employed by their
foreign ministries were slightly more inclined to mention restructuring
issues than those who had never worked for their foreign ministries.
Table 2 shows that those respondents who felt that the United States,
the European Community, and Japan frequently opposed solutions sought
by their countries (cf. fn. 6, Qijb, the question used in the construction
of the polarization index) were inclined to list the restructuring of
international institutions as an important measure for facilitating the
economic growth of developing countries.
The sharpest distinction among the negotiators concerned the expe-
rience of their respective countries in international commodity markets.
Those whose countries had experienced declining terms of trade in the
1970s were much more likely to mention measures concerning com-
modities than those whose countries had experienced stable or improv-
TABLE 2
SALIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL RESTRUCTURING IN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
(percentages)
View of Opposition
Did not mention
U.S., EEC, and Japan
Mentioned U.S., EEC,
and Japan
Did Not Mention
Restructuring
(n=23)
70
30
Mentioned
Restructuring
(n=21)
38
62
Chi square 4.38, level of significance .04
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ing terms of trade during this period.9 The relationship is shown in
Table 3.
The respondents' attitudes toward development strategies were also
related to the institutional frameworks within which they were nego-
tiating, though not in the obvious ways. One might expect that partic-
ipants would stress the issues with which they were currently dealing:
thus, participants in GATT would stress market access; in UNCTAD,
commodities; and in UNDP, economic assistance. Actually, negotiators
in all of the forums except the ACP-EEC Council were more likely to
mention measures relating to financial assistance than any other category.
However, negotiators in UNDP and UNCTAD were equally as likely
to mention institutional restructuring. As collective entities, both UNDP
and UNCTAD have pressed for greater authority and resources. By
contrast, only slightly more than one-third of the negotiators (n= 12) in
GATT —which has authority in international commercial policy com-
parable to that which UNCTAD would like to gain—mentioned re-
structuring. The frequency with which GATT negotiators mentioned
market access was no greater (n= 12). An even smaller proportion of
UNCTAD negotiators (n = 2) mentioned commodities, and only one of
the negotiators in the ACP-EEC Council mentioned commodities, de-
spite the fact that the system for the stabilization of earnings from
commodity exports is one of the principal features of the Lome Con-
vention. On the other hand, more than half of the ACP-EEC negotiators
TABLE 3
SALIENCE OF COMMODITY MEASURES IN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
(percentages)
Did Not Mention Mentioned
Commodity Measures Commodity Measures
Terms of Trade (n=38) (n=22)
Country experienced
declining terms of
trade 39.5 68.2
Country experienced
stable or improving
terms of trade 60.5 31.8
Chi square 4.59, level of significance .03
9
 The figures for terms of trade were taken from International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, World Development Report, igyg (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1979), Table
8, "The Growth of Merchandise Trade," 140-41. Index numbers in this table use the terms
of trade for 1970 as a base. Countries with index numbers of less than 100 for 1977 were
categorized as experiencing declining terms of trade, and those with index numbers of 100
or more were categorized as experiencing stable or increasing terms of trade.
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mentioned market access and institutional restructuring (67 percent and
58 percent, respectively).
Respondents appeared to accept the philosophical positions generally
articulated in the institutions in which they were participating. Thus,
restructuring was salient for those in UNCTAD and UNDP, but not
for those in GATT. At the same time, the negotiators almost seemed
to minimize the importance of the substantive problems on which they
were working, perhaps out of a sense derived from their experience of
the limitations of feasible policies.
The five categories of domestic measures are: (1) social policy; (2)
economic policy; (3) issues concerning the functioning of political and
governmental institutions and processes; (4) steps to increase the role of
government in the economy; and (5) idiosyncratic proposals (a residual
category). Social policy includes responses related to education and to
health care, especially family planning. Economic policy includes a broad
range of responses that mentioned diversifying exports, developing par-
ticular economic sectors, increasing investment, developing infrastruc-
tures, and making increased use of technology. The third category,
political and governmental factors, includes the need for more govern-
mental stability, better political leadership, greater political mobilization,
and streamlined institutions. The fourth category consists of suggestions
for national economic planning, control of investment, and nationali-
zation of foreign-owned enterprises. Several of the responses in the final
category dealt with moral issues. Economic policy issues were mentioned
by more respondents (59 percent, n = 34) than any other category of
internal measures. Twenty-eight percent of the respondents (n=i6)
mentioned political and governmental issues, and 24 percent (n = 14)
mentioned social issues. Twelve percent (n = 7) discussed increasing the
role of government in their economies. Thirty-six percent ^ = 21) gave
idiosyncratic responses, making this the second largest category of re-
sponses after economic policy measures.
As was the case with respect to external measures of development,
the internal measures mentioned were not significantly related to the
respondents' personal attributes, but they were related to aspects of their
roles. Again, GATT negotiators tended to mention more internal meas-
ures than the negotiators in other forums. They appeared to have broader
perspectives concerning development strategies, although the difference
is not nearly as marked as in the former case.
The United Nations Development Program and the U.N. Economic
and Social Council have mandates that clearly involve domestic economic
development policies; such matters are not as much within the purview
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of GATT, UNCTAD, and the ACP-EEC Council. However, negoti-
ators in the latter three were much more likely to mention domestic
economic policies than those in UNDP and ECOSOC. Table 4 shows
the distribution of responses. Negotiators who have to deal with external
measures through their concentration in international trade issues appear
to develop both a sense of the linkages between international trade and
domestic economic policy and of the limitations of international measures
as strategies for stimulating economic growth.
As mentioned above, only twelve percent (n = 7) of the respondents
mentioned increasing the role of government in economic management
as a measure important to stimulating economic growth. While no
national of a socialist state gave such a response, three of the persons
who did were among the 15 negotiators in ECOSOC and the ACP-
EEC Council, and 4 were among the 41 negotiators in the other three
institutions—a significantly disproportionate distribution (Chi square
3.76, level of significance .05). Again, the negotiators appear to have
been influenced by the philosophical positions generally articulated in
the institutions in which they operated: both ECOSOC and the ACP-
EEC Council are more likely to stress governmental planning than the
other bodies.
Finally, whether or not G-77 respondents mentioned social issues was
significantly related to the level of wealth of their countries. Only one
of the 20 respondents from low-income countries who discussed internal
measures to promote economic growth mentioned social issues. By con-
trast, 11 of the 33 respondents from the other G-77 s t a t e s noted social
issues, such as the need to increase educational opportunities and to slow
the rate of population growth (Chi square 5.71, level of significance .02).
There appears to be an income threshold below which these issues are
not salient.
TABLE 4
SALIENCE OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY MEASURES
IN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
(percentages)
Negotiating Forums
GATT, UNCTAD
and ACP-EEC
UNDP and ECOSOC
Did Not Mention
Domestic Economic
Policy Measures
(n=23)
56.5
43.5
Mentioned
Domestic Economic
Policy Measures
(n=33)
88
12
Chi square 7.11, level of significance .008
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010157
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:09:20, subject to the Cambridge Core
REVOLUTIONARIES OR BARGAINERS? 351
The most notable feature about our respondents' views concerning
development strategies is that they are both moderate and pragmatic.
Their focus on the international transfer of resources and on domestic
economic issues coincides with many mainstream Western economic
analyses. Only a small minority wanted to increase the role of govern-
ment in economic management. Fewer than half perceived the restruc-
turing of international institutions as an important issue. Not surpris-
ingly, this issue was salient for those who felt that the major Western
states had blocked solutions which their countries had sought to eco-
nomic problems. Commodity issues were salient for those whose coun-
tries had experienced declining terms of trade. In other words, preferred
development strategies appear to be causally related to concrete expe-
riences.
Perhaps most striking is the fact that participation in negotiations on
a particular subject appears to result in a sense of the limitations of
solutions in the relevant area, rather than of the opportunities. On the
other hand, negotiators have a tendency to take on the philosophical
views generally articulated in the organizations in which they work.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Beyond examining broad views toward development strategies, we
were concerned with certain narrower key issues that have been prom-
inent in international discussions about development and in the NIEO
debate. Regional economic cooperation among LDCs has been advanced
as an important technique for promoting development goals ever since
Raul Prebisch and his associates in the U.N. Economic Commission for
Latin America began publicizing the idea in the 1950s. It has been a
significant element of the U.N.'s international development strategies,
and a large number of economic cooperation schemes have been created
among LDCs.10 Our interviews explored the respondents' attitudes to-
ward regional cooperation among LDCs and the extent of coordination
in the negotiations among states that were members of regional economic
cooperation schemes.
Of the 75 respondents, only one, an OECD national, doubted that
membership in a regional economic cooperation group could have a
beneficial effect on the economic growth of a member state. Ninety-two
10
 For a description of the nature and institutional structures of many of these organi-
zations, see Dusan Sid janski, Current Problems of Economic Integration: The Role of Institutions
in Regional Integration Among Developing Countries (Geneva: U.N. Publication Sales No.
E.73,II.D.io, 1974); see also U.N. Document TD/13/609, Economic Cooperation and Integra-
tion Among Developing Countries (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1976), Vols. I and II and Addenda
Vols. 1-5.
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percent (11 = 69) gave unqualified affirmative responses, and 7 percent
(n = 5) were affirmative with some qualifications. When we asked the
respondents to explain why membership in a regional group could be
beneficial, we coded up to 3 different explanations. More than two-thirds
of these (68 percent, n = 103) related to specialization in production and
economies of scale. Respondents said that regional economic cooperation
could lead to the creation of larger markets and more rational utilization
of resources. Fifteen percent (n = 23) dealt with increasing the bargaining
strength of the member states in international negotiations, and 7 percent
(n= n ) broadly referred to increasing the political power of the mem-
bers. Only 2 percent (n = 3) said that regional groups of states would be
in a better position to control transnational corporations than the same
states acting alone. The outstanding feature of the responses is the
overwhelming concentration on the internal aspects of regional economic
cooperation, a focus that logically accompanies an economic development
strategy emphasizing import substitution.
Strengthening the bargaining position of member states in interna-
tional negotiations is one of the putative advantages mentioned in the
literature about regional economic cooperation. We therefore asked sev-
eral questions designed to ascertain whether delegates from regional
economic groups actually took measures to coordinate their positions
during the negotiations, and the extent to which they sought to adopt
common stands. Five questions were particularly relevant to this issue."
" The questions, and illustrative answers indicative of regional cooperation, are as follows:
(Q8) How does your country determine its position concerning the issues that are
involved in the negotiations?
A. In consultation with members of the regional economic cooperation to which
the state belongs; by persons in the national capital and in consultation with the
members of the regional cooperation group.
(Qn) Are there countries or groups of countries which your country regularly consults
concerning the issues that are involved in the negotiations? Which countries does
your country consult with respect to which issues?
A. Name of the regional group or of countries that are members of the group.
(Q13) What importance do you attach to consultations with your country's partner
countries in (name of the regional group to which the country belongs)?
A. Very important; important; of some importance.
(Q13C) Do the states involved in the consultations agree to coordinate negotiating po-
sitions?
A. Always; generally; occasionally.
(Q17) With which countries is your country most frequently aligned during this round
of negotiations?
A. Mention of the regional group to which the country belongs or of individual
members of the group.
Regional cooperation was indicated by 21% (n=io) of the responses to question 8; 28%
(n= 13) to question 17; 68% (n = 32) to question 11; 83% (n = 39) to question 13c; and 87%
(n = 4i) to question 13.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010157
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:09:20, subject to the Cambridge Core
REVOLUTIONARIES OR BARGAINERS? 353
We used responses to these questions to create an index of regional
group cohesion.12
This index was applied to G-77 delegates representing states belonging
to eight prominent economic cooperation organizations: the East African
Community (EAC); the Central African Customs and Economic Union
(UDEAC, after its French title, Union douaniere et economique de VAf-
rique centrale); the Economic Community of West African States (ECO-
WAS); the West African Economic Community (CEAO, after its French
title, Communaute economique de I'Afrique de I'Ouest); the Andean Com-
mon Market (ANCOM); the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); the
Central American Common Market (CACM); and the Association of
South East Asian States (ASEAN). Forty-seven of the respondents were
nationals of member states of one or more of these organizations. Their
responses were weighted so that, in the instances in which the sample
included more than one respondent from a member state, the total would
be equal to that of a member state that was represented in the sample
by only a single respondent. The responses of 4 of the 47 delegates
gained the maximum possible score of 15. The composite score for each
group was calculated by averaging the weighted scores of respondents
from countries belonging to the organization. Thus, the composite score
is an average of country scores.
The scores are shown in Table 5. Since the probability of achieving
a relatively high score is affected by the number of respondents in the
sample and the relationship of this number to the number of countries,
and since the validity of the score is related to the proportion of member
states included in the sample, these figures are provided in addition to
the average of the weighted scores for each of the eight groups and their
rank orders.
In the literature on regional economic cooperation it is generally
argued that the stronger an organization's central community institu-
tions, the more effective the cooperation should be, including their co-
ordination of bargaining in international negotiations. In the light of
this proposition, ASEAN's and CARICOM's high scores on the cohesion
index are surprising. The members of ASEAN had only just agreed to
" Each question was weighted equally. For each, a response indicating regional coop-
eration was given a score of 3, making 15 the maximum possible. In cases where respondents
could either mention the regional group or members of it (questions 11 and 17), respondents
were awarded a score of 3 if they gave the name of the regional group, or scores of 1 for
each individual member state; respondents could not receive more than 3 points, but they
could receive 1 or 2 if they merely mentioned the names of 1 or 2 other members of the
regional scheme. For questions 8 and 13, the scoring was either 3 or o. For question 13c,
responses of "always" or "generally" were scored 3, and responses of "occasionally" were
scored 2. Applying a Guttman Scale to the five questions coded in this manner yielded a
coefficient of reproducibility of i.oo.
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create a central secretariat and to appoint a Secretary-General of this
secretariat in 1976, the year in which the interviews were conducted.
CARICOM's central institutions were also weaker than those of the
other organizations. On the other hand, the East African Community's
dismal showing clearly reflected the crisis that led to its demise in 1977.
If the strength of the central community institutions of regional or-
ganizations is not the key to explaining the extent of their cohesion,
what are the important factors? Since the G-77 delegates were predom-
inantly acting as instructed agents, one would not expect their personal
characteristics to make much difference, and indeed they generally did
not. However, the regional groups that achieved higher scores on the
cohesion index tended to have more delegates with greater experience
and higher rank than those that achieved lower scores.
More important for the relative cohesion of the regional groups was
the nature of the negotiations in which most of the respondents were
participating. G-77 delegates participating in GATT and UNCTAD
were much more likely to engage in practices of regional group co-
ordination than those in the ECOSOC, UNDP, and the ACP-EEC
Council. (Chi square 75.78, level of significance .0000.) Since GATT
and UNCTAD have mandates that focus directly and exclusively on
international trade issues, while the other institutions have mandates
that are more diffuse, regional issues would seem to be more clearly at
stake in GATT and UNCTAD; consequently, one would expect greater
regional cooperation there. The sharpness of the relationship, though,
is striking. There is also a significant relationship between regional group
cohesiveness and states that have exports of substantial absolute value.^
Relative levels of economic development are even more strongly re-
lated to levels of regional cohesion. There is almost a perfect relationship
between the rank order of the eight groups on the cohesion index and
the rank order of the groups' median per capita GNPs.'t The Kendall
tau-beta rank-order correlation for regional group cohesion and the
median per capita GNP for the groups is .9966 (level of significance
.0000). Were it not for the fact that ANCOM and CACM had identical
median per capita GNPs, this relationship would have correlated per-
fectly. We found earlier that rising per capita GNP appears to be related
13
 The results of a least-square regression are (11 = 32):
Regional Group cohesion = 3.75 + .0003 Exports
(Standard Error .00014)
R square .15, standard error of estimate 2.11, level of significance .03
(The partial coefficient is unstandardized)
14
 Because of the distorting effects of petroleum export earnings on per capita GNP of
Gabon and Venezuela, median per capita GNP seems to be a more appropriate measure
than mean per capita GNP.
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to a sharpening perception of bloc polarization; it appears to be even
more strongly related to increasing ability for groups of countries to act
cohesively in international negotiations.
ASEAN's high score on the regional group cohesion index is, in
addition, a testimonial to the effectiveness of the large-scale UNCTAD
project financed by UNDP that was designed to assist ASEAN's member
states in the GATT Tokyo Round. Project personnel emphasized the
importance of regional cooperation during the negotiations, and pro-
vided advice about how it could be achieved. While this may have made
up for ASEAN's absence of central institutions, it in no way diminishes
the relationship between economic development and group cohesion.
The project made sense because ASEAN's member states had important
economic interests at stake in the negotiations—a clear consequence of
the level of economic development that the states had achieved.
NEGOTIATORS' VIEWS CONCERNING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
In the confrontation about a new international economic order, de-
fining the appropriate role for transnational corporations (TNCs) has
been one of the principal issues. Several of our questions were designed
to ascertain the negotiators' views about TNCs and their role in the
world economy. The first was: "What in your view are the economic
implications of the expansion of transnational corporations for devel-
oping countries?" Of the 65 negotiators who responded to the question,
9 percent unambiguously stated that the implications were positive; 45
percent answered that the implications were mixed (both positive and
negative); 14 percent gave answers that took a neutral stance; and 32
percent answered that the implications were clearly negative. Of the
three G-77 nationals working as IGO officials and the three OECD
delegates who responded, none gave a purely negative answer. In view
of the rhetoric that has dominated some international meetings, the fact
that only one-third of the respondents expressed exclusively negative
views should be noted. The proportion of G-77 delegates expressing
only negative views was only slightly higher (36 percent, n = 2i) than
that of the total sample.
Nonetheless, those with negative views were a sizable minority; their
personal attributes were significantly related to their answers. Those
who expressed negative views tended to be under 40 years of age rather
than over 40; to have concentrated in a social science in their university
studies rather than in other subjects; and to be currently employed by
their foreign ministry, or to have worked for their foreign ministry at
some time, rather than never to have had a connection with it. Table
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6 shows these relationships. There is a strong interaction between age
and education. Training in the social sciences had virtually no impact
on the views toward TNCs of the respondents who were over 40 years
of age (Chi square .02, level of significance .89), but was strongly as-
sociated with the views expressed by those under 40 (Chi square 4.92,
level of significance .03, tau-beta .34).
The nationality of the respondents was also strongly associated with
their view of transnational corporations. First, as Table 7 shows, nationals
of socialist states were more likely to express a negative view of the
implications of the expanding role of TNCs than those from states with
capitalist or mixed systems. Second, nationals of states with higher per
capita GNP were less likely to express a negative view of TNCs than
TABLE 6
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND VIEWS CONCERNING T N C S
(percentages)
View on TNCs
Not exclusively
negative
Exclusively
negative
Chi square 3.20, level
Not exclusively
negative
Exclusively
negative
Chi square 4.87, level
Not exclusively
negative
Exclusively
negative
Chi square 6.11, level
Personal Attributes
A G E
Under 40
(n = 44)
Over 40
(n=19)
61.4 84.2
38.6 15.8
of significance .07
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
Social Science
(n = 43)
Other
(n = 21)
58.1 85.7
41.9 14.3
of significance .03
FOREIGN MINISTRY EXPERIENCE
Some
(n = 44)
59.1
40.9
of significance .01
None
(n = 20)
90.0
10.0
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TABLE 7
ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND VIEWS CONCERNING T N C S
(percentages)
View on TNCs
Not exclusively negative
Exclusively negative
Economic System
Capitalist
and Mixed
(n=54)
74.1
25.9
Socialist
36.4
63.6
Chi square 5.94, level of significance .01
those of states with lower per capita GNP.15 When the respondents are
considered as nationals of OECD states and of G-77 states, the negative
view continues to be significant for the latter group, but not for the
former: it is stronger among G-77 delegates than among the broader
group of G-77 nationals.'6
States with higher per capita GNP probably are more familiar with
TNCs; that may give their nationals a greater sense of confidence in
dealing with them, and also a better appreciation of the potential benefits
they offer.
The five factors discussed thus far—the three personal attributes of
age, education, and career experience, plus the two role attributes related
to the economic system and the level of per capita GNP of the respond-
ent's state—can be combined in a regression analysis using the respond-
ents' views concerning the implications of the expanding role of TNCs
as the dependent variable. The results of a least-squares regression are
15
 Using only the 56 responses that can be coded as negative, mixed, or positive, a least-
squares regression of these views with the per capita GNP of the respondents' states produces
the following results:
TNC Attitude = 2.37 + .0001 per capita GNP
(Standard error .00004)
R square .10, standard error of estimate .62, level of significance .02
(The partial coefficient is unstandardized)
16
 The results of the three least-squares regression are:
OECD Delegates (n=j) TNC Attitude = 2.29 +.0003 per capita GNP
(Standard error .00055)
R square .23, standard error of estimate .72, level of significance .68
G-77 Nationals (11=41) TNC Attitude = 2.19 +.0001 per capita GNP
(Standard error .00004)
R square .12, standard error of estimate .56, level of significance .03
G-yy Delegates (n = 38) TNC Attitude = 2.18 +.0001 per capita GNP
(Standard error .00004)
R square .14, standard error of estimate .55, level of significance .02
(The partial coefficients are unstandardized)
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shown in Figure 2. In combination, these five independent variables
explain almost 50 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.
Respondents to the question about the implications of the expanding
role of TNCs expressed their views in some detail. Up to four responses,
two positive and two negative, were coded for each respondent. The
following positive features of TNCs were mentioned by respondents:
they provided for the transfer of technology (n = 16), promoted indus-
trialization and development (n= 15), brought investment (n= 14), and
provided jobs (n = 9). The negative feature mentioned most frequently
was that TNCs interfered with state affairs (n = 27)—for example, by
ignoring laws. Other negative aspects were that transnational corpora-
tions failed to reinvest in the host countries (n=i9), interfered with
development planning (n=i6), and pursued harmful pricing policies
(n= 10). Both the positive and negative features are frequently cited in
scholarly discussions. Except for the respondents' emphasis on sover-
eignty, their views are not strikingly different from those of others who
have concerned themselves with the role of transnational corporations.
In order to understand how much the negotiators' views were based
on the direct experience of their states, we asked, "What has been the
experience of your country in regard to transnational corporations?"
Thirty-two percent of the 59 negotiators who answered this question
reported that their countries' experience had been mixed; 22 percent
gave exclusively negative answers, and 19 percent gave exclusively pos-
itive answers. Seventeen percent said that their countries had had so
little experience with transnational corporations that they could not
comment, and 10 percent gave neutral responses.
There is a strong association between the answers to the question
concerning the implications of the role of TNCs in the world economy
and to that about the experience of the respondents' countries with
TNCs. Those who gave a negative response to one were likely to give
a negative response-to the other; so, too, with positive responses (Chi
square 18.72, level of significance .03). Negative experiences with TNCs
are most strongly associated with respondents from countries that have
nationalized several TNCs. Table 8 shows the relationship. Apparently,
countries either nationalized TNCs because of bad experiences with
them, or their bad experiences grew out of the process of nationalization.
As one would expect, states with socialist economies were much more
likely to nationalize foreign investment than those with capitalist or
mixed economies (Chi square 47.69, level of significance .0001). And
states with higher per capita GNP were less likely to nationalize TNCs
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FIGURE 2
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ATTITUDES TOWARD T N C S
(n = 54)
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES
Age
(Partial .49,
sig. .0003)
Measured in
5-year
segments
Education
(Partial .32,
sig. .02)
(1) Concentration
in social or political science
(2) Other
concentration
Foreign Ministry
Experience
(Partial. 34,
sig. .02)
(1) Some foreign
ministry experience
(2) No foreign
ministry experience
VIEW OF
IMPLICATIONS
OF EXPANDING
ROLE OF T N C s
ROLE ATTRIBUTES
Economic System (1) Socialist
(Partial .29, (2) capitalist
sig. .04) and mixed
Per Capita GNP
(Partial .36,
sig. .01)
/
(1) Negative
(2) Mixed (negative and
and positive)
(3) Positive
Actitude toward TNCs = — .43 + .16 Age + .36 Educational + .38 Foreign Ministry
Background Experience
(Standard (Standard (Standard
error .40) error .15) error .15)
+ .36 Economic System - .00009 per capita GNP
(Standard
error .15)
(Standard
error .00003)
R square .49, standard error of estimate .49, level of significance .0000
(The partial coefficients are unstandardized)
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TABLE 8
RESPONDENTS' EXPERIENCES WITH T N C S AND
NUMBER OF NATIONALIZATIONS OF T N C S
(percentages)
Number of Experience with TNCs
Nationalizations, Positive Mixed Neutral Negative
1960-1976* (n = U) (n = 19) (n=6) (n = 13)
0 18.2 42.1 100 15.4
1-5 54.5 15.8 0 30.8
6-10 18.2 21.1 0 23.1
More than 10 9A 2 U 0 30.8
Chi square 19.21, level of significance .02
"Source: United Nations Document E/C.10/38, Transnational Corporations in World De-
velopment: A Reexamination (New York: United Nations, 1978, E.78.II.A.5), 232.
than those with lower per capita GNP.17 In other words, negotiators'
views concerning the implications of the growth of TNCs appear to
have been strongly associated with their own countries' experiences, and
particularly with the contentious issue of nationalization.
Finally, we asked respondents how the influence of transnational
corporations on developing countries could be made more beneficial.
Twenty-nine percent (n= 19) commented on the need to develop some
measure of international control, 27 percent (n= 18) stated that the host
countries should exercise greater control, and 14 percent (n = 9) said that
the TNCs themselves must develop attitudes of responsibility and change
their policies. Six percent (n = 4) asserted that the home countries of the
TNCs should exercise greater control, and another 5 percent (n = 3)
spoke of control in general terms. Only 3 percent (n = 2) mentioned the
possibility of regional economic organizations' developing investment
codes, and another 3 percent suggested that host countries should na-
tionalize or threaten to nationalize the TNCs. Six percent asserted that
the influence of TNCs could not be made beneficial, and the remaining
5 negotiators who responded to this question gave individualistic re-
sponses. Views on making the influence of TNCs more beneficial were
not related to either the personal or role attributes of the respondents;
they appear to be distributed randomly.
The general moderation and sophistication of the views concerning
17
 A least-squares regression using the number of nationalizations categorized as the
dependent variable, and per capita GNP as the independent variable, resulted in the following
equation (n = 79):
Nationalize TNC = 2.51 —.0002 per capita GNP
(Standard error .00007)
R square .07, standard error of estimate 1.16, level of significance .02
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TNCs is impressive. Almost 60 percent of the respondents made at least
some positive comment about the expanding role of TNCs in world
development and in the economies of the LDCs. The catalog of potential
benefits offered by TNCs, and the problems they may cause, broadly
resembles an academic treatise on the subject. At the core of the con-
tention between less developed countries on one side, and the TNCs
and their Western home countries on the other, appears to be a concern
of the LDC nationals about the sovereignty of their countries. One could
hypothesize that this concern is the reason for a large number of the
nationalizations. Whether negative views about TNCs cause national-
ization or vice versa, there is a strong association between the two. Not
many negotiators, however, advocated nationalization as a strategy for
dealing with TNCs. Clearly, nationalization was not the negotiators'
preferred policy for dealing with transnational corporations. Whether
or not a larger number would advocate nationalization if efforts to
achieve international or national control proved fruitless or unsatisfactory
remains to be seen. In any case, the nationals of the poorer rather than
of the relatively richer states (as measured by per capita GNP) were
more likely to express negative views about TNCs. It will be interesting
to see if this relationship holds as levels of per capita GNP increase.
Progress toward appropriate and effective measures of control will prob-
ably be an important determining factor.
NEGOTIATORS' VIEWS CONCERNING THE LOME CONVENTION
In 1975, about a year before the interviews were conducted, the
member states of the European Economic Community and more than
40 African, Pacific, and Caribbean states had signed the first Lome
Convention. (By 1982 there were 63 signatories.) The Convention re-
placed the Yaounde Agreement that had been in force for several years
and had governed the economic relations between the original six mem-
bers of the EEC and several of their former colonies. Even though some
of its stipulations had existed in the earlier agreement, the new Con-
vention, because of its many new features, was widely regarded as a
response to the LDCs' demands for changes in the international eco-
nomic order.
The Lome Convention provided for tariff-free and quota-free entry
into the EEC for all manufactured goods and more than 95 percent of
the agricultural products from the ACP countries. The mechanisms
provided under the STABEX system for stabilizing the ACP countries'
earnings from the exports of their primary commodities were the Con-
vention's most innovative and notable feature. It also continued the
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European Development Fund (established in the earlier agreement for
transferring resources to the LDC signatories), but expanded the re-
sources that would be available to it and earmarked some of them for
projects that would promote regional economic cooperation among the
ACP recipients. Decision making concerning the implementation of the
Convention was to be handled in the ACP-EEC Council. Fourteen of
the respondents included in our survey participated in the first session
of this Council. In a broad way, the Lome Convention offered an al-
ternative conceptualization of North-South economic relations that em-
phasized substantial efforts to manage market forces; EEC and ACP
signatories alike applauded it as a progressive move in North-South
economic negotiations.
We asked our respondents whether or not they thought the Lome
Convention was "beneficial for the developing countries that are in-
volved." Seventy-three percent (n = 54) answered without qualification
that it was beneficial, and another 22 percent (n= 16) felt that it was
beneficial in some ways. The features of the Convention concerning the
treatment of the ACP countries' commodity exports, including the
STABEX mechanisms, were mentioned by more than half of the respond-
ents in explaining why they thought that the Convention was beneficial.
Four percent of the respondents (n = 3) said it was to soon to evaluate
the effects of the Lome Convention. The only respondent who expressed
an exclusively negative view was a participant in the ACP-EEC Council.
For this individual, working with the Convention appears to have led
to a tendency to be more critical than those who did not have first-hand
experience with it. As a group, however, the participants in the ACP-
EEC Council were as positive toward the Lome Convention as other
respondents.
When confronted with the issue of the broader application of the
Lome concepts, the respondents' enthusiasm dropped. To our question
whether they thought the Lome Convention should "be regarded as a
model for defining the relationship between developed and developing
countries," only 37 percent (n = 26) answered yes; 23 percent (n=i6)
equivocated, indicating in some manner both yes and no; 10 percent
(n = 7) said that it was too soon to tell; and 31 percent (n = 22) answered
unambiguously no.
The hesitation about applying the Lome formula more broadly is not
easy to explain. A majority of those who thought that problems associated
with the export of primary commodities should be dealt with in order
to promote economic growth responded that it was too soon to tell
whether or not the Lome Convention should be a model for North-
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South relations generally. In view of the novelty of the STABEX mech-
anisms, they apparently wanted to see how the program would be
implemented.
Nationals of states with socialist economies were much more likely
to be negative about using the Lome Convention as a model than those
from states with capitalist or mixed economies, as shown in Table 9.
On the other hand, nationals of states that were parties to the Lome
Convention were more likely to be in favor of its being used as a model
than those who were not: nationals of that subset of states that had been
associated with the EEC through the Yaounde Agreement were even
more likely to be positive on this question.18
These two role attributes of the negotiators—whether they were na-
tionals of socialist states or of states that were parties to the Lome
Convention and the Yaounde Agreement—were the only factors that
significantly predicted their view of the desirability of Lome as a model
for structuring North-South economic relations. Put in a least-squares
regression, however, the two factors explain less than 15 percent of the
variance.
Again, the rather random character of attitudes toward the desirability
TABLE 9
ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND VIEWS CONCERNING THE LOME CONVENTION AS
A MODEL FOR NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(percentages)
View toward Lome
as a Model
Not exclusively negative
Exclusively negative
Chi square 5.77, level of significance
18
 The relationship is:
Views Concerning
Lome as a Model
Positive
Mixed
Negative
Economic System
Capitalist
and Mixed
(n=60)
73.3
26.7
.02
Yaounde
Signatories
(n = i7)
64.7
11.8
23-5
Socialist
(n=9)
33.3
66.7
Slates not Parties
to Yaounde
("=47)
31-9
29.8
38.3
Chi square 5.72, level of significance .06
The difference between the nationals of states that were parties to the Lom£ Convention
and all others is not large enough to be statistically significant. However, the difference
between nationals of states that had been parties to the earlier Yaounde Agreement and all
others is statistically significant.
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of using the Lome Convention as a model for North-South economic
relations may well have stemmed from the relative newness of the
agreement at the time the interviews were conducted. Negotiators gen-
erally were familiar with its terms, but at that time they could know
little about how it would be implemented. The negotiators overwhelm-
ingly viewed the Convention as beneficial to its LDC parties. The fact
that nationals of those states that had had the longest associations with
treaty arrangements linking the EEC and LDCs were the most likely
to favor using Lome as a model could indicate that, as experience with
Lome progresses, individuals may become more favorably inclined to-
ward applying its features more broadly.
GLOBAL BARGAINING ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
WORLD PRODUCT
Our analysis illuminates the NIEO negotiations in several ways. First,
the negotiators' views are much more diverse than would appear from
analyses of roll-call votes. In the U.N. General Assembly, where each
state has one vote, the Western industrial states appear to be a belea-
guered minority faced by an implacably hostile and firmly united coa-
lition of less developed and communist countries. The data and analyses
presented here show that the LDC component of this coalition, while
it might find it tactically advantageous to vote as a bloc, actually contains
a wide spectrum of views, with only a minority seriously hostile toward
the Western industrialized states and their economic institutions.
It is fair to ask whether positions of governments can validly be
inferred from the responses of individual delegates. The argument is
supported by the fact that our respondents were important government
officials who had some say in the formulation of their countries' policies,
and who were charged with executing these policies. Moreover, time
and again, role rather than personal attributes emerged as significant
predictors of their attitudes. It therefore seems clear that the answers
of our respondents were strongly influenced by their official positions
and responsibilities. In other words, they could hardly have been ex-
pected to give answers that would seriously contravene their govern-
ments' policies.
A second conclusion is that the positions taken in the NIEO nego-
tiations are firmly grounded in national political processes and in prag-
matic conceptions of a country's national economic interests. The LDC
delegates in our sample were only marginally less "instructed" than the
OECD delegates, and the process in which their instructions were pre-
pared was just as complicated. Positions that countries take in inter-
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national economic negotiations are more the result of proceedings in
national capitals than of proceedings in the international institutions
sponsoring these negotiations; disagreements are most frequently caused
by conflicting national economic interests, not by the procedures of
international institutions. The negotiators' concepts of desirable strate-
gies to promote economic development were notable for their pragmatic
emphases. They tended to stress issues that were quite clearly related
to their countries' economic needs. Only a small minority argued for
substantive governmental intervention in domestic economic affairs, and
the pressure for restructuring institutions was relatively modest.
Third, despite all of the information produced by international and
national agencies, LDC negotiators obviously felt a need for more in-
formation, as evidenced by their extensive consultations with IGOs and
INGOs. They clearly would appreciate having more information avail-
able to them, or perhaps the information that is available should be
better organized to suit their needs. Efforts at institutional reform could
well concentrate on this issue. Because of the relatively small populations
of most LDCs, their bureaucracies will never be able to match the
capabilities of the major Western industrialized states.
Fourth, respondents from countries with socialist economies stand
out as a group with distinctive views. Although negotiators from all
states were inclined to stress the transfer of resources to developing
countries more than any other measure as a desirable action to promote
economic development, negotiators from socialist states emphasized this
issue even more strongly. They were less inclined to consult INGOs
than their colleagues from states with capitalist and mixed economies,
and more likely to have negative views about transnational corporations
and about using the Lome Convention as a model for North-South
economic relations.
Fifth, although the negotiators almost unanimously supported re-
gional economic cooperation rhetorically, efforts to achieve cohesion in
the several regional groups varied markedly, and not according to the
strength of the regional organizations. At least as of 1976, the negotiators
saw regional economic cooperation primarily in terms of import sub-
stitution rather than of export promotion, thus de-emphasizing almost
to the point of ignoring one of the putative advantages of regional
cooperation. In several cases, they gave little evidence of attempting to
act as members of coordinated regional groups.
Sixth, the effect of participation in economic negotiations conducted
within the framework of international institutions appears to be modest
but consequential. Individuals seem to accept to some extent the broad
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philosophical positions generally articulated within the institutions. More
importantly, in working with particular substantive issues, individuals
are likely to become more sophisticated about the real potentialities and
limitations of possible solutions in the relevant area. Those who were
involved in real negotiations about trade issues, rather than merely
talking about them, were more inclined to take the the view that so-
lutions in other areas are also essential.
Seventh, and perhaps most significant, are the attitudinal and behav-
ioral characteristics associated with nationals of states that have higher
per capita GNPs. They are: (i) heightened perceptions of polarization,
but also include (2) paying greater attention to such social issues as the
need for limiting population growth and promoting education as im-
portant elements of development strategies; (3) more cohesive behavior
among the members of regional economic cooperation organizations;
and (4) less negative views toward transnational corporations. Whether
these relationships will continue as the level of countries' per capita GNP
increases remains to be seen. If they did, global bargaining about eco-
nomic issues would become neither less salient nor less intense. Indeed,
conflicts of economic interest may well be pursued more forcefully in
the future, with LDCs taking advantage of the added strength that
membership in regional groups can give them. However, some of the
ideological contention may be removed from these negotiations, partic-
ularly if appropriate international measures can be crafted to control
some of the more objectionable practices of transnational corporations;
greater attention may also be given to important domestic aspects of
development.
On the basis of this analysis, the NIEO negotiations appear to be
misnamed. They are not really negotiations about the creation of a "new"
international economic order; rather, they are—in the apt phrase coined
some years ago by Helmut Schmidt—a "struggle for the world prod-
uct."'9 Those who are disadvantage^ in the existing international eco-
nomic system can be expected to continue to call for action (such as
greater intervention in market forces to redress their condition), and to
bargain to better their position (just as those comparably disadvantaged
in domestic political systems have done). But that hardly amounts to a
revolutionary call for the overthrow of the old order.
•« Schmidt, "The Struggle for the World Product," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52 (April 1974),
437-5'-
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